Records kept since 1940 tell a contrasting story: even as the census has introduced labor-saving technologies, it has required more, not fewer, workers. The efficiency of census-taking appears to have declined over time as it has for most of the economy.Below the fold, some commentary.
Furth's post takes off from Census Technology, Politics, and Institutional Change, 1790-2020 by Steven Ruggles and Diana L. Magnuson. An extract from their abstract:
The case study of the census reflects the critical and shifting role of the state and the private sector in the development of technology. For most of the twentieth century, Census Bureau administrators resisted private-sector intrusion into data capture and processing operations, but beginning in the mid-1990s, the Census Bureau increasingly turned to outside vendors from the private sector for data capture and processing. This privatization led to rapidly escalating costs, reduced productivity, near catastrophic failures of the 2000 and 2010 censuses, and high risks for the 2020 census.
For most of the twentieth century, however, Census Bureau administrators adamantly resisted private-sector intrusion into data capture and processing operations. Beginning in 1907, the Census Bureau maintained its own machine shop that designed and manufactured data processing equipment, in direct competition with machinery produced by the private sector. For nine decades the Census Bureau was able to maintain bureaucratic autonomy, doing all data capture and processing in-house, mainly using purpose-built equipment engineered and manufactured by Census Bureau staff. As Carpenter has shown, similar bureaucratic autonomy occurred across a variety of federal agencies where mid-level staff developed unique capabilities that enabled them to resist political pressures.The Clinton administration put an end to all that:
Census Bureau autonomy ended abruptly in the 1990s. Ideological shifts of the late 20th century redefined the role of government. Under pressure from the Clinton administration, the Census Bureau privatized data capture. In 1996 the Census Bureau closed the machine shop and began to outsource Census data capture operations to private vendors. Privatization led to rapidly escalating costs, reduced productivity, and near catastrophic failures of the 2000 and 2010 censuses. As we approach the 2020 Census, the risk of a major failure in data capture and processing is palpable.The authors' account of the disastrous outsourcing of the 2000 and 2010 censuses is a standout even among the dismal history of government IT contracts and gouging by defense contractors. Here is the 2000 version:
the cost for the Lockheed Martin contract jumped from $49 million to $220 million, and the contract to TRW went from $188 million to $314 million.These increased costs were easy to predict:
There were many unanticipated costs. The contractors did not consult with the Census Bureau personnel who had institutional knowledge and experience processing millions of paper forms. The Bureau’s lack of experience with contractors led to inefficiencies. Requirements were poorly documented, resulting in frequent changes. There were major philosophical differences between the contractors and the Bureau, especially in the area of quality assurance. Misunderstanding led to change orders, which increased costs.It wasn't merely higher costs, it was lower quality:
The digital imaging and OCR systems did not work as well as anticipated. The scanning machines were far slower than the FOSDIC machines they replaced. It took approximately thirty-five of the new Kodak machines to do the work of a single FOSDIC machine, so the number of scanning machines grew dramatically. The 1990 census used twenty-one FOSDIC machines, which DCS 2000 replaced with 162 Kodak Digital Science Scanner 9500 machines. Despite the increased number of machines, overall data capture throughput declined by some 75%.
The handheld device contract with the Harris Corporation was an even greater disaster. The software did not function correctly, the work fell behind schedule, and the projected cost more than doubled to $1.3 billion. In 2008 the Census Bureau abruptly canceled the plan to use the handheld devices for non-response follow-up and reverted to entirely paper-based processing. The last-minute change further increased the cost of the 2010 census by up to three billion dollars, making the Harris debacle one of the most expensive failed software systems in history.In June last year's The Risks Of Outsourcing I discussed Why public sector outsourcing is less efficient than Soviet central planning by Abby Innes of the London School of Economics . She points to the inevitable information asymmetry that places the buyer of outsourcing at a disadvantage:
The following market failures are rife in public service markets: high barriers to entry leave public service markets dominated by monopoly or oligopoly firms which render the provider relatively immune from the self–correcting mechanisms of market competition; uncertainty and complexities in contractual requirements create huge information asymmetries between buyer and seller; relationship–specific investments encourage the producer to exploit the loss of bargaining power entailed by sunk costs (i.e. ‘hold-up’ problems); and finally, negative spillovers, that is to say, damaging external effects not reflected in the original price of the transaction are particularly problematic given systemic interdependencies, for example between NHS and social care systems.These problems aren't specific to the public sector, Boeing was warned about them in a 2001 internal report OUT-SOURCED PROFITS –THE CORNERSTONE OF SUCCESSFUL SUBCONTRACTING by L. J. Hart-Smith:
The point is made that not only is the work out-sourced; all of the profits associated with the work are out-sourced, too. The history of the former Douglas Aircraft Company is cited as a clear indication of what these policies have done – and as a warning of what more may be done. The subcontractors on the DC-10 made all of the profits; the prime manufacturer absorbed all of the over-runs.The report fell on deaf ears, as Mike Collins discussed in The Boeing Supply Chain Model:
On January 29, 2003, Boeing decided to design an all-new airplane made out of composites. They called it the 787 and the design idea was to make the plane light and fuel-efficient, to be a long range airplane. The dream for this aircraft was to move manufacturing to its Tier 1 suppliers who would coordinate with Tier 2 and 3 suppliers, and all Boeing would have to do was assemble the parts and save a whole bunch of time, effort, and money.Undeterred, the financial wizards in charge of Boeing continued outsourcing and have ended up facing COVID-19 with all three of their business segments in dire straits. In New document reveals significant fall from grace for Boeing’s space program, Eric Berger writes:
August 2009 -- Boeing announces a $2.5 billion charge to third quarter earnings and pushes deliveries to the 4th quarter of 2010 – 2 years later than the original schedule.
Much has been made of Boeing's difficulties in aviation, most notably with the 737 Max. This airplane has been grounded for a year after two crashes that killed 346 people between them, collectively making for the worst air disaster since September 11, 2001.Boeing's massive stock buybacks mean it can't survive without a massive taxpayer bailout which, being "too big to fail", it will get. But even a huge bailout can't fix the fundamental mistake in the past. In 797. The Plane That Never Was, Patrick Smith writes about low aerospace productivity and the future of the mid-size market segment:
Then there are the issues with the company's KC-146 Pegasus tanker program, which is $3 billion over budget, three years behind schedule, and beset by technical issues. Most recently, in March, the Air Force revealed that it had upgraded chronic leaks in the aircraft's fuel system to a Category I deficiency. This is a problem for an aircraft that is supposed to perform aerial refueling.
Since December, the company's space issues have also become more widely known following the failure of the company's Starliner capsule to successfully carry out a test flight to the International Space Station.
But a new document released by NASA reveals the broader scope of Boeing's apparent decline in spaceflight dominance.
Indeed, we might not see an all-new design from Boeing or Airbus for the next 30 years. one factor is the incredible amount of time it takes nowadays for a plane to move from the planning stages to commercial service. How things have changed. Fifty years ago, the 747 went from an idea on the back of a napkin to an actual, flying aircraft, in two years. Today, just building a derivative from an existing model can take twice that long. And that’s what we’ll continue seeing: more derivatives. Boeing has been milking the 737 since 1965. The A320 debuted in 1988. One can easily see the 777, 787, A330 and A350 tracking similar evolutions. We won’t have a new model because they take too long and they’re too damn expensive, and also because there won’t be a need for one: derivatives will have all the possible ranges and seating combinations covered for the foreseeable future. The 797 was the one remaining niche crying out for a new plane. Boeing chose to ignore it; Airbus threw a patch on it. And off we go.Given the likely decrease in demand for air travel in the wake of COVID-19, the mid-size segment is probably critical:
Airbus has stepped in with the A321-XLR, a stretched, longer-range, souped-up version of the baseline A320. A 757 knockoff, it kind of, almost, sort-of-but-not-really does the job. A downer, I know, but that’s as close as we’re going to get.Productivity is the ratio of outputs to inputs. It is easy for companies or institutions to believe that by outsourcing, replacing internal opex and capex by payments to suppliers, they will get the same output for less input. But experience tends to show that in most cases the result is less output for more input. The Gadarene rush to outsource may be a major contributor to the notorious decay of productivity (See Scott Alexander's Considerations on Cost Disease for many examples).
Airbus will sell a thousand XLRs, mark my words. For carriers it’s the only option. And Boeing will be left looking dumber than it does already.