Thursday, October 19, 2017

Preserving Malware

Jonathan Farbowitz's NYU MA thesis More Than Digital Dirt: Preserving Malware in Archives, Museums, and Libraries is well worth a more leisurely reading than I've given it so far. He expands greatly on the argument I've made that preserving malware is important, and attempting to ensure archives are malware-free is harmful:
At ingest time, the archive doesn't know what it is about the content future scholars will be interested in. In particular, they don't know that the scholars aren't studying the history of malware. By modifying the content during ingest they may be destroying its usefulness to future scholars.
For example, Farbowitz introduces his third chapter A​ ​Series​ ​of​ ​Inaccurate​ ​Analogies thus:
In my research, I encountered several criticisms of both the intentional collection of malware by cultural heritage institutions and the preservation of malware-infected versions of digital artefacts. These critics have attempted to draw analogies between malware infection and issues that are already well-understood in the treatment and care of archival collections. I will examine each of these analogies to help clarify the debate and elucidate how malware fits within the collecting mandate of archives, museums, and libraries
He goes on to to demolish the ideas that malware is like dirt or mold. He provides several interesting real-world examples of archival workflows encountering malware. His eighth chapter Risk​ ​Assessment​ ​Considerations​ ​for​ ​Storage​ ​and​ ​Access is especially valuable in addressing the reasons why malware preservation is so controversial.

Overall, a very valuable contribution.

Tuesday, October 17, 2017

Will HAMR Happen?

For more than five years I've been skeptical of the storage industry's optimistic roadmaps in general, and the idea that HAMR (Heat Assisted Magnetic Recording) will replace the current PMR (Perpendicular Magnetic Recording) as the technology for hard disks any time soon. The first ship date for HAMR drives has been slipping in real time for nearly a decade, and last year Seagate slipped it again:
[Seagate] is targeting 2018 for HAMR drive deliveries, with a 16TB 3.5-inch drive planned, featuring 8 platters and 16 heads.
Now, Chris Mellor at The Register reports that:
WDC has given up on heat-assisted magnetic recording (HAMR) and is developing a microwave-assisted technique (MAMR) to push disk drive capacity up to 100TB by the 2030s.

It's able to do this with relatively incremental advances, avoiding the technological development barrier represented by HAMR. These developments include multi-stage head actuation and so-called Damascene head construction.
Below the fold, I assess this news.

Thursday, October 12, 2017

Crowdfunding

ExoLife Finder
I've been a fairly enthusiastic crowdfunder for the past 5 years; I started with the Raspberry Pi. Most recently I backed the ExoLife Finder, a huge telescope using innovative technology intended to directly image the surfaces of nearby exoplanets. Below the fold, some of my history with crowdfunding to establish my credentials before I review some recent research on the subject.

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

IPRES 2017

Kyoto Railway Museum
Much as I love Kyoto, now that I'm retired with daily grandparent duties (and no-one to subsidize my travel) I couldn't attend iPRES 2017.

I have now managed to scan both the papers, and the very useful "collaborative notes" compiled by Micky Lindlar, Joshua Ng, William Kilbride, Euan Cochrane, Jaye Weatherburn and Rachel Tropea (thanks!). Below the fold I have some notes on the papers that caught my eye.

Thursday, October 5, 2017

Living With Insecurity

My post Not Whether But When took off from the Equifax breach, attempting to explain why the Platonic ideal of a computer system storing data that is safe against loss or leakage cannot exist in the real world. Below the fold, I try to cover some of the implications of this fact.

Wednesday, October 4, 2017

OAIS & Distributed Digital Preservation

One of the lessons from the TRAC audit of the CLOCKSS Archive was the mis-match between the OAIS model and distributed digital preservation:
CLOCKSS has a centralized organization but a distributed implementation. Efforts are under way to reconcile the completely centralized OAIS model with the reality of distributed digital preservation, as for example in collaborations such as the MetaArchive and between the Royal and University Library in Copenhagen and the library of the University of Aarhus. Although the organization of the CLOCKSS Archive is centralized, serious digital archives like CLOCKSS require a distributed implementation, if only to achieve geographic redundancy. The OAIS model fails to deal with distribution even at the implementation level, let alone at the organizational level.
It is appropriate on the 19th anniversary of the LOCKSS Program to point to a 38-minute video about this issue, posted last month. In it Eld Zierau lays out the Outer OAIS - Inner OAIS model that she and Nancy McGovern have developed to resolve the mis-match, and published at iPRES 2014.

They apply OAIS hierarchically, first to the distributed preservation network as a whole (outer), and then to each node in the network (inner). This can be useful in delineating the functions of nodes as opposed to the network as a whole, and in identifying the single points of failure created by centralized functions of the network as a whole.

While I'm promoting videos, I should also point to Arquivo.pt's excellent video for a general audience about the importance of Web archiving, with subtitles in English.

Tuesday, October 3, 2017

Not Whether But When

Richard Smith, the CEO of Equifax while the company leaked personal information on most Americans (and suffered at least one more leak that was active for about a year up to last March) was held accountable for these failings by being allowed to retire with a mere $90M. But at Fortune, John Patrick Pullen quotes him as uttering an uncomfortable truth:
"There's those companies that have been breached and know it, and there are those companies that have been breached and don't know it,"
Pullen points out that:
The speech, given by Smith to students and faculty at the university's Terry College of Business, covered a lot of ground, but it frequently returned to security issues that kept the former CEO awake at night—foremost among them was the company's large database.
Smith should have been losing sleep:
Though it was still 21 days before his company would reveal that it had been massively hacked, Equifax, at that time, had been breached and knew it.
Two years ago, the amazing Maciej Cegłowski gave one of his barn-burning speeches, entitled Haunted by Data (my emphasis):
imagine data not as a pristine resource, but as a waste product, a bunch of radioactive, toxic sludge that we don’t know how to handle. In particular, I'd like to draw a parallel between what we're doing and nuclear energy, another technology whose beneficial uses we could never quite untangle from the harmful ones. A singular problem of nuclear power is that it generated deadly waste whose lifespan was far longer than the institutions we could build to guard it. Nuclear waste remains dangerous for many thousands of years. This oddity led to extreme solutions like 'put it all in a mountain' and 'put a scary sculpture on top of it' so that people don't dig it up and eat it. But we never did find a solution. We just keep this stuff in swimming pools or sitting around in barrels.
The fact is that, just like nuclear waste, we have never found a solution to the interconnected problems of keeping data stored in real-world computer systems safe from attack and safe from leaking. It isn't a question of whether the bad guys will get in to the swimming pools and barrels of data, and exfiltrate it. It is simply when they will do so, and how long it will take you to find out that they have. Below the fold I look at the explanation for this fact. I'll get to the implications of our inability to maintain security in a subsequent post.